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I. Introduction
In 2002, a U nited States Supreme Court
decision struck a serious blow to federal child
pornography prosecutions. In Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the
Supreme Court found two of the four thenexisting definitions of child pornography to be
unconstitutional. The first of these was 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8 )(B), which defined "child pornography"
to include visual depictions that "appear[] to be"
of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
This definition, often referred to as the "virtual
child pornography" definition, included com putergenerated images or images of adults who
appeared to be minors. The C ourt foun d this
provision to be unconstitutionally overbroad. In
particular, the Court concluded that the definition
extended beyond the traditional reach of obscenity
as described in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), that the Court's decision in New Y ork v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) could not be
extended to support a complete ban on virtual
child pornograph y, and that the government's
argum ents in favor of the prohibition were
insufficient under the First Amendment. Ashcroft,
at 246-52, 256. The aftermath of this portion of
the Court's decision is the focus of this article.
By invalidating these important features of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 225 1-22 60 , the Court's
decision left the government in an unsatisfactory
position that warranted a prompt legislative
response. As a result of the Free Speech decision,
defendants frequ ently contend that there is
"reasonable dou bt" as to whether charged images,
particularly digital images on a com puter, w ere
produced with an actual child, or as a result of
some other process. Occasionally, there are
experts who are willing to testify to the same
effect on the defend ants' behalf. Withou t a
8

provision that covers highly-realistic computergenerated images, it is difficult to meet the burden
of proof when images are of real, but unidentified,
children. This problem has the potential to grow
increasingly worse as trials devolve into confusing
battles between experts arguing over the method
of generating im ages that look like, and prob ably
are, real children. Even in cases involving
identified victims of ch ild pornography, it is very
difficult for prosecutors to arrange for one of the
few law enforcement witnesses who have met the
child to be available for any given child
pornography trial.
II. The need for a "Free Speech fix"
Congress sought to remedy these concerns
with the enactment of the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of
Children T oday A ct of 2003 (P RO TECT Act),
Pub. L. No. 108-066, 117 Stat. 650, on April 30,
2003. The PRO TEC T Act greatly enhances
federal child pornography law by, among other
things, replacing with a new provision the prior
definition of "child pornography" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(B) that was struck by the Free Speech
court. Title V, Subsection A of the PROTEC T Act
directly responded to the Free Speech decision by
creating a new provision in § 2256(8)(B) that
defines child pornography to include computerbased depictions that are indistinguishable from
those involving real children. The PROTECT Act
also expands the affirmative defense applicable to
cases brou ght under § 2256(8)(B) in respon se to
the Supreme Court's criticism of the prior law.
The PROTEC T Act child pornography
provisions more narrowly focus federal child
pornography law on the government's core
interest: preserving its ability to enforce laws
proscribing child pornography produced using
real children. To further this interest, the
PR OT EC T A ct makes fundam ental changes with
respect to the "virtual" child pornography ban in
§ 2256(8)(B), and the corresponding affirmative
defense in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). Thus, the
PR OT EC T A ct includes in the definition of child
pornography images that, to an ordinary observer,
could pass for the real thing. At the same time, the
PROTE CT Act provision gives a defendant the
ability to escape conviction under the child
pornography statutes if he can establish that the
image was not produced using a real child.
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The changes brought about by the PROTECT
Act are inten ded to add ress the Sup reme Court's
concerns that legitimate expression might
improperly fall within the scope of the child
pornography laws. T he provision is therefore
narrowly tailored in four ways to advance the
government's compelling interest, without casting
a broad net over protected speech. First, the
proscription of virtual images is limited to digital,
computer or computer-generated images. Second,
the images must genuinely look like they depict
real children. Third, the sexual content must be
particularly explicit. Fourth, the defendant can
escape conviction through an affirmative defense
by establishing that the images were produced
without the use of a real child. As set forth in
more detail below, the new provision provides an
important response to the Sup reme Court's
concerns in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.
III. The details of the new child pornography
provisions
The centerpiece of the PROTECT Act's
response to the Free Speech decision was to
amend § 22 56(8)(B) to read as follows:
such visual depiction is a digital image,
computer image, or computer-generated
image that is, or is indistinguishable from,
that of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct;

Along w ith narrow ing the definition of child
pornography, the PROTEC T Act limits the scope
of sexual conduct depicted that is actionable for
virtual child pornography under § 2256(8)(B ).
(Note that this new definition does not affect
prosecutions u nder either § 2256 (8)(A) or (C)).
Thus, a new provision, § 2256(2)(B), contains a
defin ition of sexually ex plicit cond uct sp ecific to
§ 2256(8 )(B):
(B) For purposes of subsection 8(B) of this
section, 'sexually explicit conduct' means–
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or
oral-anal, whether between persons of the
same or opposite sex, or lascivious simulated
sexual intercou rse, where the genitals, breast,
or pubic area of any person is exhibited;
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated;

18 U .S.C. § 2256(8 )(B) (2003 ).
Among other changes, the new definition
substitutes the phrase "indistinguishable from []
that" of a minor for the "appears to be" phrase
struck down by the Court in Free Speech. A new
provision, § 2256(11), explains the meaning of
"indistinguishable" as follows:
the term "indistinguishable," used with respect
to a depiction, m eans virtually
indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such
that an ordinary person viewing the depiction
would conclude that the depiction is of an
actual minor engaged in sexually ex plicit
conduct. This definition does not apply to
drawings, cartoons, sculptures or paintings
depicting minors or adults.
18 U .S.C. § 2256(1 1) (2003).
The definition thus clarifies that only the most
convincing depictions of ch ild pornography,
which are indistinguishable from those depicting
real children, are proscribed.
Further narrowing the scope of the virtual
child pornography definition, § 2256(8)(B) is now
explicitly limited to "digital image[s]," "computer
M A R C H 2004

image[s]," and "computer-generated image[s]."
This limitation implicitly acknowledges the power
of computer imaging technology both to alter
actual child pornography and to generate
simulated child pornography. Because the use of
computers and digital technology to traffic images
of child pornography implicates the core of the
government's practical concern about
enforceability, "drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or
paintings," which cannot pass for the real thing,
are specifically excluded from the scope of
§ 2256(8 )(B).

(I) bestiality;
(II) masturbation; or
(III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of any person;
18 U .S.C. § 2256(2 )(B) (2003 ).
This provision, in turn, relies upon a new
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 22 56(10), which defines
"graphic":
'graphic', when used w ith respect to a
depiction of sexually explicit conduct, means
that a viewer can observe any part of the
genital area of any depicted person or animal
during any part of the time that the sexually
explicit conduct is being depicted[.]
Notably, the new provision requires a
simu lated image to be lascivious to constitute
child pornography under § 2256(8)(B). Thus,
child porn ography that sim ulates sexually ex plicit
conduct (as opposed to depicting actual sexually
explicit conduct) must be lascivious, as well as
meet the other requirement of the definition. The
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combined effect of these changes is to narrow the
definition of sexually explicit conduct in cases
involving virtual child pornography under
§ 2256(8)(B). In such cases, sexually exp licit
conduct must be graph ic or, if simulated, also
lascivious.
The PROTEC T Act also significantly amends
the affirmative defen se in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
Previously, the affirmative defense was available
in cases involving transportation, distribution,
receipt, and reproduction of child pornography if
the defendant could prove that the alleged child
pornograph y was prod uced using an actual adult,
and was not pandered in such a manner as to
convey the impression that it was child
pornography. In Free Speech, the Court criticized
the affirmative defense on the grounds that it
incompletely protected defendants' First
Am endment rights. Specifically, the Court
observed that the affirmative defense was not
available to a defendant who could prove that real
children were not involved in the production of
the images, but who had pandered the material as
child pornography. 535 U.S. at 256. The Court
was also concerned that the defense did not extend
to possession offen ses. Id.
The new affirmative defense eliminates both
of the problems identified by the Court. First, the
affirmative defense now includes possession
offenses. Second, while prior law only granted an
affirmative defense for productions involving
youthful-looking adults, and only allowed the
defense if the defendant did not pander the
material as child pornography, a defendant can
now prevail simply by showing that no children
were used in the production of the materials. In
other words, a defendant can now prevail by
establishing that the images do not depict actual
children. The defendant must, however, provide
notice to the govern ment of an intention to assert
the affirmative defense no later than ten days
before trial.
IV. Application of the new provisions and
alternative charges
Since the enactment of the PRO TE CT Act,
prosecutors have several options to consider in
child pornography cases. The Department of
Justice (Department) expects that the "virtual
porn" provision of the PROTEC T Act will face
constitutional challenges. Because it is possible
that those challenges will ultimately be heard by
the Supreme Cou rt, Assistant United States
Attorneys (AUSA s) considering charges under the
new child pornography definition in § 2256(8)(B)
should be m indful that their cases are just as likely
as any other to serve as the vehicle for a
10

challenge. Prudence dictates that, until the
challenges are finally resolved by the Supreme
Court, prosecutors should carefully evaluate and
scrutinize their use of the new provisions, and
include "safe harbor" or back-up charges in their
indictm ents to the extent such charges are
available.
Several aspects of the images should be
considered before a charging decision is made.
The images should be of good quality, ap pear to
show real children , and depict sexually ex plicit
conduct, if possible. In addition, given the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the potential literary
and artistic merit of materials exploring teenage
sexuality, images of prepubescent children shou ld
be given preference over those of older children.
In all cases, prosecutors and law enforcement
should continue their efforts to identify children
depicted in the images. The identification of
known victims is essential in determining which
victims of child pornography have not yet been
identified and protected from further harm.
Prosecutions under § 2256(8)(B) will also be in a
stronger position against any constitutional
challenge if some of the charged images depict
known victims. In cases brought under the old
child pornography statutes, the identification of
known victims is useful even if it is not feasible to
introduce evidence regarding the child's identity at
trial. The identification of known victims can
often lead to plea agreements or to stipulations
that charged images depict actual minors engaged
in sexu ally explicit conduct.
Prosecutors considering charging under the
pre-existing child pornography provisions, rather
than the new § 2256(8)(B), should keep in mind
that the identification of known victims is by no
means the only way to meet the governm ent's
burden of proving that charged images depict real
children engaging in sexually ex plicit cond uct.
Indeed, there is support for the position that
simply entering the images into evidence can meet
the government's burden.
The three circuits that have addressed the
issue in light of the Free Speech decision have
concluded that the jury can make its decision by
simply viewing the images themselves. See
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding that juries are capable of
distinguishing between "real and virtual images"
and that neither expert testimony nor evidence of
victim identity is required by the Free Speech
decision); United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454,
455 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that
images alone were sufficient to prove that
production of charged images involved u se of a
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real minor); Un ited States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250,
1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that desp ite
unconstitutional jury instruction, examination of
charged images showed that no reasonable jury
could have found that images depicted virtual
children as opposed to actual children).
Prosecutors in child pornography cases may also
want to support their proof that images depict real
children by presen ting the testimony of a
physician that characteristics such as the
proportions, body fat distribution, and skin tone of
the children depicted are consistent with those of
real children. See United States v. Bender, 290
F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
In cases that proceed under the new 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(B), charging some images under one of
the obscenity provisions, 18 U .S.C . §§ 1460-70, is
also an effective way to ensure that convictions
will stand in the event that § 2256(8)(B) is struck
dow n as u nconstitutional. The new obscenity
statute enacted as part of the PROT EC T A ct,
§ 1466A , is one of the possible backup charges.
This statute is directed to the obscene visual
represen tation of the sexual abuse of children. See
18 U.S.C. § 1466A (2003). When p ossession, as
opp osed to receipt or distribution, of the im ages is
all that can be shown, the new § 1466A(b) is the
only available federal obscenity provision because
it is the only one that includes possession within
its prohibitions. When receipt or distribution can
be shown, however, obscenity provisions other
than § 1466A can be used. In addition, while
§ 1466A(a)(1) is likely to be a safe charge,
§ 1466A (a)(2) should be used with caution as a
backup charge due to the likelihood that it will be
challenged.

Finally, care should be taken to develop a
strong record when accepting pleas to ch ild
pornography charges. First, to the extent the
record supports it and the defendant agrees, the
plea colloquy should unequivocally reflect that the
defendant is pleading to child pornography
involving real minors. If the government has
evidence suggesting that one or more of the
charged images depicts an identified minor, the
fact that such evidence exists should be part of the
colloquy.
V. Conclusion
The situation before the enactment of the
PROTE CT Act was unacceptable, as many
meritorious cases involving child pornography
were not being brought, or were creating an
unnecessarily heavy drain on law enforcement and
prosecutorial resources. T he Su preme Court's
decision in Free Speech made enforcement of the
child pornography laws substantially more
difficult and threatened to reinvigorate this
pern icious traffic and harm more children . While
the D epartment was disapp ointed with the Court's
decision, any legislation must necessarily respect
it and endeavor, in good faith, to resolve the
constitutional deficiencies in the prior law that
were identified by the Court. The Department
believes that the PROT EC T A ct has succeeded in
doing so.
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